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Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty

Ed. by Fréchette, Guillaume / Taieb, Hamid

Series:Phenomenology & Mind 19

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November 2017
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Marty on Abstraction

Fréchette, Guillaume


The varieties of accounts of abstraction in the school of Brentano seem to be a function of the different views adopted on ontology, by Brentano himself but also by his students. The line going from conceptualism to empiricism, realism, and later to reism in Brentano’s works is therefore a good guide to understand the evolution of the accounts of abstraction in the school of Brentano. Independently of the views adopted in ontology however, and in contrast with Husserl for instance, it seems that Brentano remained constant in his rejection of the view that abstracting and intuiting should be considered as two distinct modes of consciousness. Husserl addressed an important objection to Brentano’s empiricist account of abstraction in the second Logical Investigation. Brentano never answered to this objection directly. But Marty did. In the following paper, and in order to appreciate Marty’s reply, I offer a reconstruction of Brentano’s and Marty’s early conceptions of abstraction, which serves as the basis for an exposition of Marty’s late account of higher abstraction. I argue that this late account, partly based on Brentano but also developing ideas to which Brentano was opposed, offers a fruitful alternative to Husserl’s view on abstraction in the Logical Investigations.

Citation Information

Guillaume Fréchette (2017). Marty on Abstraction. In Guillaume Fréchette, Hamid Taieb (Eds.), Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty (pp. 169–194). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-008

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480

Online ISBN: 9783110531480

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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