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Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty

Ed. by Fréchette, Guillaume / Taieb, Hamid

Series:Phenomenology & Mind 19

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November 2017
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Marty against Meinong on Assumptions

Richard, Sébastien


In this paper I explain Meinong’s introduction of assumptions into the Brentanian classification of mental phenomena. These are understood as mental acts that consist in the simple positing of a complex content, where belief about what is posited is abstracted. Marty was not convinced by Meinong’s arguments in favour of this new class of mental phenomena and maintained that this role could be played by presentations alone. He even tried to show that the notion of assumption is contradictory. I here analyse these Martian critiques and Meinong’s complex answer to them.

Citation Information

Sébastien Richard (2017). Marty against Meinong on Assumptions. In Guillaume Fréchette, Hamid Taieb (Eds.), Mind and Language – On the Philosophy of Anton Marty (pp. 219–240). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480-010

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110531480

Online ISBN: 9783110531480

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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