Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

New Perspectives on Distributive Justice

Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus

Ed. by Knoll, Manuel / Snyder, Stephen / Şimsek, Nurdane

eBook (PDF)
Publication Date:
November 2018
Copyright year:
See all formats and pricing

A Defense of the Difference Principle beyond Rawls

Koller, Peter


The Difference Principle is one of the most original and disputed components of Rawls’ theory of justice. The DP, which is contained in the second of Rawls’ two principles, says that social and economic inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. The aim of my paper is to defend the DP, or at least its main idea. To this end, I will first recapitulate Rawls’ explication of the DP, and then give a brief review of his theory in general and of his various arguments for the DP in particular. After that, I scrutinize Rawls’ justification of the DP, with the result that his arguments do not succeed. Since I nevertheless regard the DP as a sound principle of socio-economic justice, finally I attempt to defend it in a slightly modified form.

Citation Information

Peter Koller (2018). A Defense of the Difference Principle beyond Rawls. In Manuel Knoll, Stephen Snyder, Nurdane Şimsek (Eds.), New Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus (pp. 469–486). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110537369-029

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110537369

Online ISBN: 9783110537369

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in