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Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong

Ed. by Dewalque, Arnaud / Raspa, Venanzio

Series:Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 10

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December 2019
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A Critique of Meinongian Assumptions

Dewalque, Arnaud


This article argues that Meinong’s analysis of assumption, while exploring the variety of phenomenological primitives in a more promising way than Brentano did, nevertheless fails to adequately account for (i) the noncommittal character of assumptive attitudes and (ii) the difference between assumptive and other neighbouring attitudes. Section 1 outlines an overall framework for the philosophical analysis of assumptions and cognitive attitudes. Section 2 gives an overview of Brentano’s analysis of cognitive attitudes and some difficulties thereof. Section 3 offers a critical examination of Meinong’s rival analysis. Eventually, Section 4 suggests an alternative route, according to which assumptive attitudes are best analysed in taking entertaining that p as a phenomenological primitive besides affirming that p.

Citation Information

Arnaud Dewalque (2019). A Critique of Meinongian Assumptions. In Arnaud Dewalque, Venanzio Raspa (Eds.), Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong (pp. 85–108). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664850-006

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664850

Online ISBN: 9783110664850

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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