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Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong

Ed. by Dewalque, Arnaud / Raspa, Venanzio

Series:Meinong Studies / Meinong Studien 10

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Publication Date:
December 2019
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Meinong’s Realist Analysis of Perception

Tegtmeier, Erwin


Early Phenomenology (Brentano, Meinong) may be understood as an attempt to overcome representationalism and idealism and to promote realism. While Brentano sees no way to defend a realist analysis of outer perception, Meinong eventually developed such an analysis. He vindicates outer perception by introducing a second kind of evidence (evidence for presumption) and by assuming in line with psychophysics that relations of comparison and other higher-order objects can be transferred from mental phenomena to physical noumena. This transference is also justified by the apriori knowability of higher-order objects. Meinong needs a transference from phenomena to noumena because he takes Galileo’s argument from physics for granted, to the effect that bodies do not have the perceptual qualities they seem to have. However, that does not make such a big difference because the exact determination of the qualities of physical objects follows the same principles as those Meinong adopts from psychophysics. In this article it is argued that the concept of presumptive evidence can be integrated into epistemological realism.

Citation Information

Erwin Tegtmeier (2019). Meinong’s Realist Analysis of Perception. In Arnaud Dewalque, Venanzio Raspa (Eds.), Psychological Themes in the School of Alexius Meinong (pp. 161–168). Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664850-010

Book DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110664850

Online ISBN: 9783110664850

© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Munich/BostonGet Permission

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