Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie

Ed. by Horn, Christoph / Serck-Hanssen, Camilla

Together with Carriero, John / Meyer, Susan Sauvé

Editorial Board Member: Adamson, Peter / Allen, James V. / Bartuschat, Wolfgang / Curley, Edwin M / Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar / Floyd, Juliet / Förster, Eckart / Frede, Dorothea / Friedman, Michael / Garrett, Don / Grasshoff, Gerd / Irwin, Terence / Kahn, Charles H. / Knuuttila, Simo / Koistinen, Olli / Kraut, Richard / Longuenesse, Béatrice / McCabe, Mary / Pasnau, Robert / Perler, Dominik / Reginster, Bernard / Simmons, Alison / Timmermann, Jens / Trifogli, Cecilia / Weidemann, Hermann / Zöller, Günter

4 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.26

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.270
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 1.111

Online
ISSN
1613-0650
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 90, Issue 3 (Jan 2008)

Issues

‘An Almost Single Inference’ – Kant's Deduction of the Categories Reconsidered

Konstantin Pollok
  • Columbia, SC
Published Online: 2009-05-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/AGPH.2008.013

Abstract

By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the A-deduction. Whereas the first step of the B-deduction is an attempt to show that the manifold of an intuition belongs to the ‘necessary unity of self-consciousness’ by means of the synthesis of the understanding, the second step has the task of showing that the very same synthesis is responsible for the spatio-temporal unity of the manifold. Thus, Kant's ‘answer to Hume’ is that no spatio-temporal objects of experience at all are merely ‘given’, independently of the conceptual activities of the understanding. Against the established view I substantiate the claim that with this ‘almost single inference’ of the second proof step the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience consequently vanished from Kant's thinking.

About the article

Published Online: 2009-05-12

Published in Print: 2008-12-01


Citation Information: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, ISSN (Online) 1613-0650, ISSN (Print) 0003-9101, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/AGPH.2008.013.

Export Citation

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in