Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Ed. by de Boer, Karin / Carriero, John / Horn, Christoph / Meyer, Susan Sauvé / Serck-Hanssen, Camilla
Editorial Board: Adamson, Peter / Allen, James V. / Bartuschat, Wolfgang / Curley, Edwin M / Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar / Floyd, Juliet / Förster, Eckart / Frede, Dorothea / Friedman, Michael / Garrett, Don / Grasshoff, Gerd / Guyer, Paul / Irwin, Terence / Kahn, Charles H. / Knuuttila, Simo / Koistinen, Olli / Kosch, Michelle / Kraut, Richard / Longuenesse, Béatrice / McCabe, Mary / Pasnau, Robert / Perler, Dominik / Radcliffe, Elizabeth S. / Reginster, Bernard / Simmons, Alison / Timmermann, Jens / Trifogli, Cecilia / Weidemann, Hermann / Zöller, Günter
CiteScore 2018: 0.53
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.395
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 1.195
This paper takes a new approach to understanding Hume’s view on causality, taking ontological as well as semantic issues into account. It attempts to attain three different goals. In the first place, it dismisses the main arguments that were put forward by the New Humeans in order to show that Hume must be regarded as a sceptical realist with respect to causality. Secondly, by employing a genetic reading of Hume’s two definitions of causality, the paper argues for an interpretation of Hume that takes his empirical criterion of meaning as seriously as possible. And thirdly, it presents a proposal to analyse the meaning of causal sentences from a Humean perspective. According to this approach, the meaning of causal sentences divides into a descriptive and a projective component. By taking advantage of Hume’s general view on meaning, we can underpin the projectivist interpretation of Hume’s theory of causality with exegetical evidence.