A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science
Ed. by Wildberg, Christian / Morison, Benjamin
The paper aims to show that ἂνoια is the general term for the diseases of the soul, and that μανία and ἀμαϑία are not necessarily two distinct species but two levels of the same disease: ignorance signifies the cognitive state, whereas madness indicates both a cognitive state and a specific phenomenal character. Plato's other remarks on psychic ailments can be incorporated into this account. The result can also be accommodated to the general theory of the soul–body relationship in the dialogue. Incarnated souls cannot work without the corresponding activity of the body, even if this does not rule out the possibility for the soul to exist in a discarnate state.
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