Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory

Ed. by Baurmann, Michael / Leist, Anton / Tranow, Ulf

Online
ISSN
2365-9858
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 11, Issue 2

Issues

Kooperative Strategien im Gefangenendilemma. Computersimulation eines N-Personen-Spiels

Andreas Diekmann / Klaus Manhart
Published Online: 2016-05-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-1989-0202

Abstract

Simulation studies in the context of Robert Axelrod’s research on iterative prisoner’s dilemma games focus nearly exclusively on the two-player- version of the game. In contrast, this article reports results of a simulation with an iterated N-prisoners’ dilemma where group size N varies between 2 and 30. The simulation investigates the relative performance of conditional cooperative strategies with increasing group size. Results show that some ‘nice’ strategies like ‘tit-for-tat’ are relatively successful and robust even in larger groups and non-nice environments. However, this does not solve the cooperation problem. On the contrary, the relative success of some ‘nice’ conditional cooperative strategies is paralleled by a rapid decline of cooperation in large groups.

About the article

Published Online: 2016-05-12

Published in Print: 1989-11-01


Citation Information: Analyse & Kritik, Volume 11, Issue 2, Pages 134–153, ISSN (Online) 2365-9858, ISSN (Print) 0171-5860, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-1989-0202.

Export Citation

© 1989 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart.

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in