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Analyse & Kritik

Journal of Philosophy and Social Theory

Ed. by Baurmann, Michael / Leist, Anton / Tranow, Ulf

Online
ISSN
2365-9858
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Volume 38, Issue 1

Issues

How the Mechanism of Dynamic Representation Affects Policy Change and Stability

Simon Tobias Franzmann / Johannes Schmitt
Published Online: 2016-05-18 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2016-0111

Abstract

In politics, we often observe stasis when, at first sight, no reason exists for such policy blockades. In contrast., we sometimes see policy change when one would expect blockades resulting from veto points or countervailing majorities. How can we explain these contradictory results concerning policy stability? In order to solve this theoretical puzzle, we develop an agent-based model (ABM). We combine established models of veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002: Ganghof-Bräuninger 2006) with the findings of political sociology and party competition. By aggregating previous party-level findings, we show that dynamic representation (Stimson et. al. 1995) provides an additional mechanism that can explain these macro-level outcomes. Parties behaving responsively to their electorate do not automatically guarantee perfect responsivity on the party system level. Further, if opposition parties also fear punishment by the electorate for government inaction, the opposition behaves more accommodatingly than previous approaches have predicted.

About the article

Published Online: 2016-05-18

Published in Print: 2016-05-01


Citation Information: Analyse & Kritik, Volume 38, Issue 1, Pages 227–256, ISSN (Online) 2365-9858, ISSN (Print) 0171-5860, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2016-0111.

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© 2016 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston.Get Permission

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