Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Jürges, Hendrik / Ludwig, Sandra

Ed. by Auriol , Emmanuelle / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / Schirle, Tammy / de Vries, Frans / Zulehner, Christine

4 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2015: 0.250
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.825

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.501
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.418
Impact per Publication (IPP) 2015: 0.455

Online
ISSN
1935-1682
See all formats and pricing
Volume 3, Issue 2 (Dec 2003)

Cross-Country Policy Harmonization with Rent-Seeking

Patrik T Hultberg
  • 1Kalamazoo College,
/ Edward B Barbier
  • 2University of Wyoming,
Published Online: 2003-12-31 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1293

Abstract

In a reciprocal market model with imperfectly competitive firms, domestic policies will differ across countries that are economically and politically diverse. We explore the implications of this standard result with regard to harmonization of environmental policies between corrupt and non-corrupt countries. Imposing a more stringent policy on a non-corrupt government will be welfare reducing to the ‘receiving’ country, but may be welfare enhancing for the ‘imposing’ country. However, where environmental standards are under the control of a corrupt government, it is possible that harmonization is welfare enhancing to both countries.

Keywords: corruption; environmental policy; rent-seeking; reciprocal market model; harmonization

About the article

Published Online: 2003-12-31


Citation Information: Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, ISSN (Online) 1538-0645, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0645.1293. Export Citation

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in