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de Vries, Frans

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Jürges, Hendrik / Ludwig, Sandra

Ed. by Auriol , Emmanuelle / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / Zulehner, Christine / Schirle, Tammy


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1935-1682
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Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters

Valentino Larcinese1

1London School of Economics and Political Science,

Citation Information: Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy. Volume 4, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1538-0645, DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1366, June 2005

Publication History

Published Online:
2005-06-12

Abstract

In spite of the negligible probability that everyone has to cast a decisive vote, political information can be relevant for a number of private decisions. Under quite mild assumptions, the demand for information is increasing in income. Being informed affects responsiveness to electoral platforms and vote-seeking political parties should take this into account in their optimization process. As a consequence, redistribution is generally lower than what the median voter theorem predicts. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature takes for granted, an increase in inequality does not unambiguously increase redistribution. This is consistent with most empirical research in this field. Finally, an increase in the cost of information induces a reduction in redistribution.

Keywords: redistribution; welfare spending; median voter; information; inequality.

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