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Auriol, Emmanuelle

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Jürges, Hendrik / Ludwig, Sandra

Ed. by Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / Schirle, Tammy / de Vries, Frans / Zulehner, Christine

4 Issues per year


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Online
ISSN
1935-1682
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Volume 7, Issue 1

Issues

Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements

Jeroen Hinloopen
Published Online: 2007-03-14 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1135

Abstract

Intuitively, extending the period of repose for price fixing agreements enhances the effectiveness of competition policy enforcement. This paper proves this intuition wrong. As extending the repose period reduces cartel members' defection payoff while it leaves unaltered expected compliance profits, it induces cartels to be more stable internally.

Keywords: cartel stability; detection probabilities; statue of limitation

About the article

Published Online: 2007-03-14


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 7, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1135.

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