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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Jürges, Hendrik / Ludwig, Sandra

Ed. by Auriol , Emmanuelle / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / Schirle, Tammy / de Vries, Frans / Zulehner, Christine

4 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.252
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.755

CiteScore 2016: 0.48

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Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.526

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1935-1682
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Volume 9, Issue 1 (Sep 2009)

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Volume 6 (2006)

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Volume 1 (2001)

Separating Equilibria in Public Auctions

Arieh Gavious
Published Online: 2009-09-03 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2183

Abstract

We consider two private-value auctions where the prize in one is higher than the prize in the other. We show that a separating equilibrium exists in which bidders with a high valuation attend the auction with the higher prize while bidders with a low valuation attend the auction with the lower prize. In addition, we prove that a weak separating equilibrium exists where the strong bidders attend the high prize auction while the weak bidders randomize and may attend either auction, although with a higher probability of attending the low prize auction. In the set of auctions with separating equilibrium, we find the optimal minimum bids that maximize a seller's expected revenue.

Keywords: auctions; separating equilibrium; selling mechanisms; private information

About the article

Published Online: 2009-09-03


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.2183.

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