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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Ludwig, Sandra / Schmitz, Hendrik

Ed. by Auriol, Emmanuelle / Barigozzi, Francesca / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mastrobuoni, Giovanni / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / de Vries, Frans / Wenzel, Tobias


IMPACT FACTOR 2017: 0.306
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.492

CiteScore 2017: 0.50

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.414
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.531

Online
ISSN
1935-1682
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Volume 12, Issue 1

Issues

Volume 19 (2019)

Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

On the Competitive Effects of Bidding Syndicates

Vlad Mares / Mikhael Shor
Published Online: 2012-09-11 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1682.2398

Abstract

Firms commonly form syndicates to bid jointly for financial assets. Recently, this practice has come under legal scrutiny motivated by models which suggest syndicates are anti-competitive. These models do not account for two important features of financial markets: bidders' value estimates are likely to be correlated, and complicated mechanisms known to be optimal in such settings are usually eschewed in favor of simpler auction formats. We show that these features make it possible for syndicate bidding to generate higher revenues for the auctioneer than bidding among independent firms, even when syndicates are asymmetric or lead to a highly concentrated market. This occurs because syndication can make the industry more suitable to the simple auction format in use. We identify conditions under which syndicates are pro-competitive and discuss the implications for antitrust.

Keywords: financial syndicates; auctions; antitrust; joint bidding

About the article

Published Online: 2012-09-11


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 12, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/1935-1682.2398.

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