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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

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Volume 13, Issue 1


Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

Institutions and information in multilateral bargaining experiments

Robert Shupp / John Cadigan / Pamela M. Schmitt / Kurtis J. Swope
Published Online: 2013-06-04 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0054


This paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. Treatments vary based on who makes the first offer (buyer or sellers), timing (consistent buyer-offer/sellers-demand or alternating), and information (buyer’s value and sellers’ costs are known or come from a uniform distribution). We find that actual bargaining outcomes are virtually identical when offers alternate, regardless of which player makes the first offer. We find that alternating offers reduce bargaining delay slightly compared to treatments in which one side or the other makes repeated take-it-or-leave-it offers. Finally, we find that incomplete information increases bargaining delay and the likelihood of failed agreements.

Keywords: land-assembly; multilateral bargaining; Rubenstein bargaining; asymmetric information

JEL classification: C92; C78; K11; J5


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About the article

Published Online: 2013-06-04

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 13, Issue 1, Pages 485–524, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, ISSN (Print) 2194-6108, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0054.

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