Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Barigozzi, Francesca

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Ludwig, Sandra / Schmitz, Hendrik

Ed. by Auriol, Emmanuelle / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mastrobuoni, Giovanni / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / de Vries, Frans / Wenzel, Tobias / Zulehner, Christine

4 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2017: 0.306
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.492

CiteScore 2017: 0.50

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.414
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.531

Online
ISSN
1935-1682
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 16, Issue 4

Issues

Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

How Lobbying Affects Representation: Results for Majority-Elected Politicians

David Stadelmann
  • University of Bayreuth, Universitätsstraße 30, 95440 Bayreuth, Germany
  • CREMA – Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
/ Marco Portmann
  • Corresponding author
  • University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
  • CREMA – Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
/ Reiner Eichenberger
  • University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
  • CREMA – Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, Zurich, Switzerland
  • Email
  • Other articles by this author:
  • De Gruyter OnlineGoogle Scholar
Published Online: 2016-12-13 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0040

Abstract:

While most observers feel that interest groups influence parliamentary decisions, direct evidence on this topic is scarce. Matching parliamentary votes with referendum results helps to bridge this gap. Existing research for politicians of the Swiss Lower House of Parliament suggests that the number of sectional and cause interest groups affect the quality of political representation. We extend this analysis to majority-elected politicians of the Upper House and by more than 50 referendum decisions for the Lower House. Our results show that the pure number of sectional or cause groups does not affect defection of politicians from their constituents which suggests that the generalizability of the results may be limited.

This article offers supplementary material which is provided at the end of the article.

Keywords: interest groups; representation; referenda; MP defection; electoral systems

JEL Classification: D70; H30

References

  • Bender B., Lott J. R. 1996. “Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature.” Public Choice 87 (1–2):67–100.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Brunner E. J., Ross S. L., Washington E. L. 2013. “Does Less Income Mean Less Representation?” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 5 (2):53–76.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Cameron A. C., Trivedi P. K., 2005 Microeconometrics – Methods and Applications. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

  • Cox G. W. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (4):903–935.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Fredriksson P. G., Wollscheid J. R. 2014. “Political Institutions, Political Careers and Environmental Policy.” Kyklos 67 (1):54–73.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Frey B. S 1994. “Direct Democracy: Politico-Economic Lessons from Swiss Experience.” American Economic Review 84 (2):338–342.Google Scholar

  • Gerber E. R., Lewis J. B. 2004. “Beyond the Median: Voter Preferences, District Heterogeneity, and Political Representation.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (6):1364–1383.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Giger N., Klüver H. 2016. “Voting against Your Constituents? How Lobbying Affects Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 60 (1):190–205.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Golder M., Stramski J. 2010. “Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 54 (1):90–106.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Ågren H., Dahlberg M., Mörk E. 2007. “Do Politicians’ Preferences Correspond to Those of the Voters? An Investigation of Political Representation.” Public Choice 130 (1/2):137–162.Google Scholar

  • Hessami Z. 2016. “How Do Voters React to Complex Choices in a Direct Democracy? Evidence from Switzerland.” Kyklos 69 (2):263–293.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Kauder B., Potrafke N. 2016. “Supermajorities and Political Rent Extraction.” Kyklos 69 (1):65–81.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Klüver H. 2012. “Biasing Politics? Interest Group Participation in EU Policy-Making.” West European Politics 35 (5):1114–1133.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Lott J. R., Davis M. L. 1992. “A Critical Review and an Extension of the Political Shirking Literature.” Public Choice 74 (4):461–484.Google Scholar

  • Matsusaka J. G. 2010. “Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5 (2):133–167.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Portmann M., Stadelmann D., Eichenberger R. 2012. “District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority’s Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes.” Public Choice 151 (3–4):585–610.Google Scholar

  • Powell G. B. 2009. “The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Election Rules.” Comparative Political Studies 42 (12):1475–1497.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Ruske R 2015. “Does Economics Make Politicians Corrupt? Empirical Evidence from the United States Congress.” Kyklos 68 (2):240–254.CrossrefWeb of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Stadelmann D., Portmann M., Eichenberger R. 2012. “Evaluating the median voter model’s explanatory power.” Economics Letters 114:312–314.Web of ScienceGoogle Scholar

  • Stadelmann D., Portmann M., Eichenberger R. 2013. “Quantifying Parliamentary Representation of Constituents’ Preferences with Quasi-Experimental Data.” Journal of Comparative Economics 41 (1):170–180.Web of ScienceCrossrefGoogle Scholar

  • Stadelmann D., Portmann M., Eichenberger R. 2016. “Preference Representation and the Influence of Political Parties in Majoritarian Vs. Proportional Systems: An Empirical Test.” British Journal of Political Science.CrossrefGoogle Scholar

About the article

Published Online: 2016-12-13

Published in Print: 2016-10-01


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 16, Issue 4, 20160040, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, ISSN (Print) 2194-6108, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0040.

Export Citation

©2016 by De Gruyter.Get Permission

Supplementary Article Materials

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in