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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Ludwig, Sandra / Schmitz, Hendrik

Ed. by Auriol, Emmanuelle / Barigozzi, Francesca / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mastrobuoni, Giovanni / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / de Vries, Frans / Wenzel, Tobias / Zulehner, Christine

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1935-1682
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Volume 16, Issue 4

Issues

Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

Consumers’ Misevaluation and Public Promotion

Atsushi YamagishiORCID iD: http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8099-150X
Published Online: 2016-10-25 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0141

Abstract:

I analyze markets in which consumers may misestimate the true value of goods and the government can affect the valuation through public promotion. When entry of firms is not allowed, the government makes consumers overvalue the goods to mitigate welfare loss from underproduction in an oligopolistic market, provided that the promotion cost is sufficiently low. On the contrary, in a free-entry market, no matter how low the promotion cost is, the government may make consumers undervalue them in order not to induce wasteful entries despite the remaining underproduction problem. In addition, my result in a free-entry market suggests that the main finding of Glaeser and Ujhelyi (J Public Econ 94: 247-257, 2010)crucially depends on the barriers to entry and the opposite result may be obtained under free entry.

Keywords: consumers' misevaluation; excess entry; public promotion

JEL Classification: L13; L38; M37

References

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About the article

Published Online: 2016-10-25

Published in Print: 2016-10-01


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 16, Issue 4, 20160141, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, ISSN (Print) 2194-6108, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0141.

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