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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Ludwig, Sandra / Schmitz, Hendrik

Ed. by Auriol, Emmanuelle / Barigozzi, Francesca / Brunner, Johann / Fleck, Robert / Mastrobuoni, Giovanni / Mendola, Mariapia / Requate, Till / de Vries, Frans / Wenzel, Tobias / Zulehner, Christine

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Volume 17, Issue 1


Volume 19 (2019)

Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations

Pio Baake / Andreas Harasser / Friederike Heiny
Published Online: 2017-03-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211


We analyse a simple supply chain with one supplier, one retailer and uncertainty about market demand. Focusing on the incentives of the supplier and the retailer to enhance their private information about the actual market conditions, we show that choices on information acquisition are strategic complements. While the retailer’s incentives are mainly driven by the information rent that he can earn, the supplier will choose to acquire information only if the retailer is rather well informed, even though the information is free of charge.

Keywords: asymmetric information; information acquisition; vertical relations

JEL Classification: D82; D83; D86


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About the article

Published Online: 2017-03-01

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 17, Issue 1, 20150211, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, ISSN (Print) 2194-6108, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211.

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