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The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy

Editor-in-Chief: Jürges, Hendrik / Ludwig, Sandra

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Volume 16, Issue 4


Volume 6 (2006)

Volume 4 (2004)

Volume 2 (2002)

Volume 1 (2001)

Coasean Quality of Regulated Goods

Marian W. Moszoro
  • Corresponding author
  • Harvard Law School, Harvard University, Hauser 320, Cambridge, MA 02138; Kozminski University, ul. Jagiellonska 57, Warsaw 03-301, Poland
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Published Online: 2016-07-21 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0019


The quality of goods provided by public utilities depends on infrastructure features and operational inputs. I compare the economic efficiency that results from price ceilings and minimum quality standards (i. e., compliance with environmental, chemical, and performance standards and norms) imposed by a benevolent regulator to a Coasean bargaining solution between a median consumer and a monopolist. When quality is non-excludable and non-rival, rate-of-return regulation yields higher economic efficiency than price cap regulation.

Keywords: public goods; network infrastructure; regulation of quality; Coase theorem

JEL Classification: H41; H54; L15; L43; L51


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About the article

Published Online: 2016-07-21

Published in Print: 2016-10-01

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Volume 16, Issue 4, 20140019, ISSN (Online) 1935-1682, ISSN (Print) 2194-6108, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2014-0019.

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