The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
Editor-in-Chief: Cavalcanti, Tiago / Kambourov, Gueorgui
Ed. by Abraham, Arpad / Carceles-Poveda , Eva / Debortoli, Davide / Lambertini, Luisa / Nimark, Kristoffer / Schwartzman, Felipe / Wang, Pengfei
IMPACT FACTOR 2017: 0.378
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.462
CiteScore 2017: 0.62
SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.553
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.605
This paper provides a new rationalization for deposit insurance and systemic disintermediations. I consider an environment in which borrowers face no penalty for failing to repay obligations except the loss of their collateral. I assume that this collateral has aggregate risk. For a subset of the exogenous parameters, I demonstrate that an optimal arrangement features deposit insurance. For a strictly smaller set of parameters, it is optimal in some states of the world to have systemic distintermediations and concomitant falls in real output.
Here you can find all Crossref-listed publications in which this article is cited. If you would like to receive automatic email messages as soon as this article is cited in other publications, simply activate the “Citation Alert” on the top of this page.