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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

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1935-1704
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Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information

Ulrich Doraszelski / Dino Gerardi / Francesco Squintani
Published Online: 2003-08-13 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1084

We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players' preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communication is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player's preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender.

Keywords: Deliberations; Strategic voting; Unanimity rule

About the article

Published Online: 2003-08-13


Citation Information: Contributions in Theoretical Economics, Volume 3, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1084.

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