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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan


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Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information

Ulrich Doraszelski1 / Dino Gerardi2 / Francesco Squintani3

1Hoover Institution,

2Yale University,

3University of Rochester,

Citation Information: Contributions in Theoretical Economics. Volume 3, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1534-5971, DOI: 10.2202/1534-5971.1084, August 2003

Publication History

Published Online:
2003-08-13

We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players' preferences. We consider two players who vote on forming a partnership with uncertain rewards. It may or may not be worthwhile to team up. Both players want to make the right decision but differ in their attitudes toward making an error. Players' preferences are private information and each player is partially informed about the state of the world. Before voting, players can talk to each other.We completely characterize the equilibria and show that the main role of communication is to provide a double check: When there is a conflict between a player's preferences and her private information about the state, she votes in accordance with her private information only if it is confirmed by the message she receives from her opponent. In a scenario where only one of the players is allowed to talk, the benefits of communication are independent of the identity of the sender.

Keywords: Deliberations; Strategic voting; Unanimity rule

Citing Articles

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[1]
Gabriele Gratton
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, Volume 84, Page 163
[2]
DAVID AUSTEN-SMITH and TIMOTHY J. FEDDERSEN
American Political Science Review, 2006, Volume 100, Number 02

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