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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


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1935-1704
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Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers

David Gill
  • 1Trinity College, University of Oxford,
/ Daniel Sgroi
  • 2Faculty of Economics and Churchill College, University of Cambridge,
Published Online: 2004-12-28 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1178

With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.

Keywords: takeovers; sequential; pivotal


Published Online: 2004-12-28


Citation Information: Topics in Theoretical Economics. Volume 4, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1534-598X, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1178, December 2004

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