Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year

IMPACT FACTOR increased in 2015: 0.412
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.471

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2015: 0.458
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2015: 0.553
Impact per Publication (IPP) 2015: 0.329

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2015: 0.16

See all formats and pricing

Price Interventions in a Cournot Oligopoly with a Dominant Firm

Priyodorshi Banerjee
  • 1Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute,
Published Online: 2007-06-08 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1348

We study a Cournot oligopoly with one low-cost (dominant) firm and one or more high-cost (subordinate) firms. If the equilibrium is interior, with all firms producing positive quantity, a reallocation of production relative to the equilibrium point, such that the dominant firm produces more, while the subordinate firms produce less, can increase consumers' surplus, as well as joint firm profit. We show that a price intervention (either a price floor or a fixed price) may help achieve such an improvement. The result hinges on the dominant firm having sufficiently low cost relative to the subordinate firms.

Keywords: dominant firm; regulation; asymmetric Cournot oligopoly; price interventions

About the article

Published Online: 2007-06-08

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1348. Export Citation

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in