Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year

IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

See all formats and pricing
More options …

Passing the Buck in Sequential Negotiation

Derek J Clark / Jean-Christophe Pereau
Published Online: 2008-12-11 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1433

We consider bargaining between three firms that are all essential in creating a surplus. One of the firms is dominant in the sense that it ultimately decides whether the surplus will be created. The other firms have an incentive to get a large share of the pie for themselves, but leaving enough for the dominant firm that it finds it profitable to create the surplus. Hence, the smaller firms have preferences over who they take their share from. The bargaining takes place in sequence, and we identify optimal choice of bargaining framework for each firm. Conditions are presented under which a firm would prefer not to be represented at a stage in the negotiation process, and we show that the preferred order of bargaining for the dominant firm is also that which maximizes the total expected surplus from negotiation.

Keywords: bargaining; surplus division; dominant firm

About the article

Published Online: 2008-12-11

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1433.

Export Citation

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in