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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


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Online
ISSN
1935-1704
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A Duopoly Model of Political Agency with Applications to Anti-Corruption Reform

Haldun Evrenk
Published Online: 2009-12-07 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1475

Using a theoretical model of political competition between two candidates who could differ in their (unverifiable) ability to produce public good, popularity, and ethics, I study the effectiveness of three commonly discussed anti-corruption reforms (higher salaries, higher penalties, and constitutional constraints on fiscal policy). In the model, each candidate proposes an income tax rate and a public good level. The difference between the collected taxes and the cost of public good is stolen by the elected politician. The voting decision is probabilistic. I show that under certain conditions each reform could increase the level of corruption or reduce the voter's welfare through other channels.

Keywords: political agency; political competition; political corruption; anti-corruption reform

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Published Online: 2009-12-07


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1475.

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