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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
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Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Oksana Loginova / Haibin Lu / X. Henry Wang
Published Online: 2009-01-22 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1501

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Keywords: peer-to-peer networks; file sharing incentive schemes; mechanism design

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Published Online: 2009-01-22


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1501.

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