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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

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Online
ISSN
1935-1704
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Incentive Schemes in Peer-to-Peer Networks

Oksana Loginova
  • 1University of Missouri,
/ Haibin Lu
  • 2University of Missouri,
/ X. Henry Wang
  • 3University of Missouri,
Published Online: 2009-01-22 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1501

In this paper we study the optimal file-sharing mechanism in a peer-to-peer network with a mechanism design perspective. This mechanism improves upon existing incentive schemes. In particular, we show that peer-approved scheme is never optimal and service-quality scheme is optimal only under certain circumstances. Moreover, we find that the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a mixture of peer-approved and service-quality schemes.

Keywords: peer-to-peer networks; file sharing incentive schemes; mechanism design

About the article

Published Online: 2009-01-22


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1501. Export Citation

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