Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
See all formats and pricing
More options …

Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments

Stefano Barbieri
  • 1Tulane University,
/ David A. Malueg
  • 2University of California - Riverside,
Published Online: 2010-02-10 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1575

We analyze a symmetric Bayesian game in which two players individually contribute to fund a discrete public good; contributions are refunded if they do not reach a threshold set by the seller of the good. We characterize the distributions of players' private values that can support a symmetric equilibrium in continuous piecewise-linear strategies, and we calculate these strategies. Allowing the seller to charge an entry fee before players make their private contributions, we show these piecewise-linear equilibrium strategies maximize the seller's expected profit over all incentive compatible selling mechanisms.

Keywords: discrete public good; subscription game; revelation principle

About the article

Published Online: 2010-02-10


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1575.

Export Citation

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in