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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
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Communication Breakdown: Consultation or Delegation from an Expert with Uncertain Bias

Anthony Rush / Vladimir Smirnov / Andrew Wait
Published Online: 2010-08-04 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1612

When communicating with an uninformed decision maker, the motives behind an expert's message are often unclear. To explore this and investigate its impact on organizational design, we extend the cheap-talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to allow for uncertainty over the expert's bias. We find that, in contrast to Dessein (2002), it is possible that the decision maker prefers communication to delegation; that is, it can be optimal for a decision maker to retain control and to solicit advice from the expert.

Keywords: delegation; communication; uncertainty; bias; cheap-talk model

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Published Online: 2010-08-04


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1612.

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©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

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