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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

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ISSN
1935-1704
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Ensuring Quality Provision through Capacity Regulation under Price Competition

Nicolas Boccard / Xavier Y. Wauthy
Published Online: 2010-10-27 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1655

We show in a simple duopoly model of vertical differentiation that when a welfare maximizing regulator wishes to ensure entry while avoiding strategic quality underprovision, regulating the incumbent's capacity is preferable to imposing a “Minimum Quality Standard” on products. In order to establish this result, we make an original contribution to the study of Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in a market with differentiated products.

Keywords: quality; minimum quality standards; price competition; capacity

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Published Online: 2010-10-27


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1655.

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