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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2017: 0.220
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.328

CiteScore 2017: 0.28

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2017: 0.181
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2017: 0.459

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2017: 0.09

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
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Asymmetry and Collusion in Sequential Procurement: A "Large Lot Last" Policy

Gian Luigi Albano / Giancarlo Spagnolo
Published Online: 2010-10-07 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1656

Sequential procurement of multiple contracts/lots is widespread and often regularly repeated. We analyze how sequentiality and its interaction with asymmetries across bidders and lots affect the sustainability of supplier/bidder collusion. Sequential procurement stabilizes supplier collusion (compared to simultaneous procurement) by allowing not only to identify or punish deviations within the sequence, but also to allocate the “last lot” to the bidder with the highest incentive to defect. We then analyze how to counteract these effects by exploiting (or creating) asymmetries in the value of lots, finding that the most effective policy procures the most valuable lot at the end of each sequence.

Keywords: bid rigging; collusion; procurement; supply; sourcing

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Published Online: 2010-10-07


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 10, Issue 1, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1656.

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