Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

2 Issues per year


IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
See all formats and pricing
More options …

Stochastic Stability in Finitely Repeated Two Player Games

Jack Robles
Published Online: 2011-04-27 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1686

We apply stochastic stability to undiscounted finitely repeated two player games without common interests. We prove an Evolutionary Feasibility Theorem as an analog to the Folk Theorem (Benoit and Krishna, 1985 and 1987). Specifically, we demonstrate that as repetitions go to infinity, the set of stochastically stable equilibrium payoffs converges to the set of individually rational and feasible payoffs. This derivation requires stronger assumptions than the Nash Folk Theorem (Benoit and Krishna, 1987). It is demonstrated that the stochastically stable equilibria are stable as a set, but unstable as individual equilibria. Consequently, the Evolutionary Feasibility Theorem makes no prediction more specific than the entire individually rational and feasible set.

Keywords: evolution; stochastic stability; repeated games

About the article

Published Online: 2011-04-27


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1686.

Export Citation

©2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston. Copyright Clearance Center

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in