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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter May 28, 2012

Commitment versus Flexibility in Enforcement Games

  • Shmuel Leshem and Avraham D. Tabbach

This paper studies the role of commitment in the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement can remedy harm from non-compliance. We consider a game between an enforcement authority ("enforcer") and an offender in which either the enforcer or the offender may act as a Stackelberg leader. The enforcer must choose whether to move first by committing to an enforcement strategy--thereby directly affecting the level of non-compliance; or rather let the offender make the first move--thereby calibrating the level of enforcement to the actual level of non-compliance. We show that the value of commitment to the enforcer depends on each player's responsiveness to a change in the other player's strategy choice. Commitment to an enforcement strategy is thus not always in the enforcer's interest.

Published Online: 2012-5-28

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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