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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter December 20, 2012

Consensual and Conflictual Democratization

  • Matteo Cervellati EMAIL logo , Piergiuseppe Fortunato EMAIL logo and Uwe Sunde EMAIL logo

Abstract

This paper studies the interactions between democratization and the emergence of rule of law. We propose a model in which heterogeneous individuals can make costly investments to protect their income against expropriation. The public enforcement of property rights is chosen by the enfranchised population whose composition depends on the political regime in place. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in terms of property rights protection and political regime, and study the role of the different scenarios of democratization. The results suggest: (i) unequal control of natural resources is a central structural determinant of the democratization scenario; (ii) democratic transitions under conflict may lead to failed democracies with poor rule of law; (iii) that democratic transitions supported by a large consensus may serve as a coordination device thereby leading to better protection of property rights and more stable polities.

Published Online: 2012-12-20

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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