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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter December 2, 2012

Asymmetric Single-peaked Preferences

  • Francisco Martínez-Mora EMAIL logo and M. Socorro Puy

Abstract

The asymmetry of single-peaked preferences has scarcely been incorporated as an assumption in economic models. We analyze how to deal with asymmetric single-peaked preferences in a tractable way. We define natural types of asymmetries, provide the tools to compare degrees of asymmetry, and propose concrete utility functions that represent different directions and degrees of asymmetry. As an application, we provide a representative voter theorem which establishes the heterogeneity in degrees of asymmetry across agents that is compatible with the median being the representative voter.

Published Online: 2012-12-2

©2012 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston

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