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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan


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A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

Noemí Navarro / Andres Perea
Published Online: 2013-05-01 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0006

Abstract

We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link, (i,j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that this procedure yields the Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if the marginal value of any link in a connected component is increasing in the number of links in that connected component.

This article offers supplementary material which is provided at the end of the article.

Keywords: Myerson value; networks; bargaining; cooperation

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About the article

Published Online: 2013-05-01

Published in Print: 2013-01-01


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 13, Issue 1, Pages 131–150, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, ISSN (Print) 2194-6124, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0006.

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