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About the article
Published Online: 2013-06-21
Published in Print: 2013-01-01
The article by Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2005) assumes a regular network (all workers have the same number of contacts), Galeotti and Merlino (2011) employs the network formation mechanism that leads to a Poisson degree distribution, and finally Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) assumes that the network is composed of cliques (components inside which all workers are connected).
Essentially, the network structures in Galenianos (2012) and Calvó-Armengol (2004) are the same, and thus, both studies should produce the same result regarding the effect of average connectivity on the employment. However, the main difference is that in Calvó-Armengol (2004) employed contacts who hear about a vacancy redirect it at random to one of their unemployed neighbors, while in Galenianos (2012) they do it regardless of the employment status of neighbors.