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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

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Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

Jonathan Newton
Published Online: 2014-02-19 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0002


This paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze two-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given. It is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders’ preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are (i) that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver and (ii) that both senders have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are anonymous, and weakly increases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are observed.

Keywords: cheap talk; editorial control; Wikipedia


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About the article

Published Online: 2014-02-19

Published in Print: 2014-01-01

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 14, Issue 1, Pages 1–25, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, ISSN (Print) 2194-6124, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0002.

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