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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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One-Sided Games in a War of Attrition

Yasushi Asako
  • Corresponding author
  • School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, 1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan
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Published Online: 2015-04-14 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0078


This study develops a war-of-attrition model with the asymmetric feature that one player can be defeated by the other but not vice versa; that is, only one player has an exogenous probability of being forced to capitulate. With complete information, the equilibria are almost identical to the canonical war-of-attrition model. On the other hand, with incomplete information on a player’s robustness, a war where both players fight for some duration emerges. Moreover, a player who is never defeated may capitulate in equilibrium, and this player will give in earlier if the other player’s fighting costs are greater.

Keywords: war; attrition; Bayesian learning; asymmetric robustness

JEL: C72; D82; D83


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About the article

Published Online: 2015-04-14

Published in Print: 2015-07-01

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 15, Issue 2, Pages 313–331, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, ISSN (Print) 2194-6124, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2014-0078.

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