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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan

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IMPACT FACTOR 2016: 0.229
5-year IMPACT FACTOR: 0.271

CiteScore 2016: 0.30

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.398
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.232

Mathematical Citation Quotient (MCQ) 2016: 0.08

Online
ISSN
1935-1704
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Tenacious Selection of Nash Equilibrium

Zeynel Harun Alioğulları
  • Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, Istiklal Cad. 10, Ulus, 06100 Ankara, Turkey
  • FASS, Sabancı University, Orhanlı, Tuzla, 34956, Istanbul, Turkey
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/ Mehmet Barlo
Published Online: 2016-06-02 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0055

Abstract

We propose a complexity measure and an associated refinement based on the observation that best responses with more variations call for more precise anticipation. The variations around strategy profiles are measured by considering the cardinalities of players’ pure strategy best responses when others’ behavior is perturbed. After showing that the resulting selection method displays desirable properties, it is employed to deliver a refinement: the tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium. We prove that it exists; does not have containment relations with perfection, properness, persistence and other refinements; and possesses some desirable features.

Keywords: anticipation; complexity; refinements of Nash equilibrium; perfect; proper; persistent

JEL: C72

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About the article

Published Online: 2016-06-02

Published in Print: 2016-06-01


Zeynel Harun Alioğulları acknowledges financial support of TÜBİTAK, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey.


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, ISSN (Print) 2194-6124, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0055.

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