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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

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Political Support and Civil Disobedience: A Social Interaction Approach

Vilen Lipatov
Published Online: 2016-05-25 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0082


People may express their opposition to government policies by adopting different measures of civil disobedience. Tax compliance is an example of an economic decision that may be affected by anti-government sentiment. Embedding the interdependence between social policies, political opposition and tax compliance in a dynamic social interaction process, we characterize a unique stable steady state of such a process. We find that social interaction may be a very important factor shaping government policies, at times reverting conventional relations between social spending and government support.

This article offers supplementary material which is provided at the end of the article.

Keywords: government support; civil disobedience; social interaction; tax compliance

JEL: H26; H50; P16


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About the article

Published Online: 2016-05-25

Published in Print: 2016-06-01

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 16, Issue 2, Pages 649–677, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, ISSN (Print) 2194-6124, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2015-0082.

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