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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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Agreeing to Disagree with Conditional Probability Systems

Elias Tsakas
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  • Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands
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Published Online: 2018-05-04 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0182


In this note, we extend Aumann’s agreement theorem to a framework where beliefs are modelled by conditional probability systems à la Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. 1999. “Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games.” Journal of Economic Theory 88: 188–230. We prove two independent generalizations of the agreement theorem, one where the agents share some common conditioning event, and one where they may not.

Keywords: Agreement; posterior beliefs; conditional probability systems; conditioning events


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About the article

Published Online: 2018-05-04

Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 18, Issue 2, 20160182, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2016-0182.

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