Abstract
We consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.
Acknowledgements
This study was carried out during the stay at University of Rochester. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer of this journal and William Thomson for their invaluable advice and suggestions. I also thank Shunsuke Hanato, Takehiko Yamato, and the participants at a study group (University of Rochester, 2018) for helpful comments. This work was partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP17J01520 and JSPS Overseas Challenge Program for Young Researchers Grant Number 201780041 (Funder Id: http://dx.doi.org/10.13039/501100001691). I thank Editage (www.editage.jp) for English language editing.
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