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The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

Editor-in-Chief: Schipper, Burkhard

Ed. by Fong, Yuk-fai / Peeters, Ronald / Puzzello , Daniela / Rivas, Javier / Wenzelburger, Jan


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1935-1704
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A Simple and Procedurally Fair Game Form for Nash Implementation of the No-Envy Solution

Makoto HagiwaraORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7182-0637
Published Online: 2019-09-12 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0051

Abstract

We consider the allocation problem of infinitely divisible resources with at least three agents. For this problem, Thomson (Games and Economic Behavior, 52: 186-200, 2005) and Doğan (Games and Economic Behavior, 98: 165-171, 2016) propose “simple” but not “procedurally fair” game forms which implement the “no-envy” solution in Nash equilibria. By contrast, Galbiati (Economics Letters, 100: 72-75, 2008) constructs a procedurally fair but not simple game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria. In this paper, we design a both simple and procedurally fair game form which implements the no-envy solution in Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Nash implementation; no-envy solution; procedural fairness; simple game form

JEL Classification: C72; D71; D78

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About the article

Published Online: 2019-09-12


Citation Information: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 20, Issue 1, 20190051, ISSN (Online) 1935-1704, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0051.

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