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Zeitschrift für Philosophie

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Kant and Kitcher on Apriority

Bernhard Ritter
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  • Institut fur Philosophie Universitat Klagenfurt Universitatsstraße 65-679020 Klagenfurt, Osterreich
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Published Online: 2014-11-13 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cpt-2009-9405


In this paper, two questions are pursued. First, is Kitcher’s account of a priori knowledge a sensible reconstruction of the Kantian notion? My general answer is: to a large extent, yes. A central problem of justification in transcendental philosophy actually demands a conception of apriority along Kitcher’s lines. Secondly, can a priori knowledge be embedded within a naturalistic framework? To this, there is no answering “yes” or “no”. However, an examination of particular limitations supports the contention that talk of justificatory procedures and beliefs should not be modelled on talk about causes and effects. The “actualistic” grammar of causality should not be allowed to dictate the shape of an epistemological theory.

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Published Online: 2014-11-13

Published in Print: 2009-12-01

Citation Information: Conceptus, Volume 38, Issue 94, Pages 45–59, ISSN (Online) 2196-9523, ISSN (Print) 0010-5155, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cpt-2009-9405.

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