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Interpretation und das Prinzip der Nachsicht

Interpretation and the Principle of Charity

PD Dr. Simon Dierig
Published Online: 2017-01-03 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cpt-2016-0008

Abstract

Davidson's principle of charity says that we should interpret someone's beliefs and utterances in such a way that these beliefs and utterances are, according to our own standards, mostly true. Davidson has advanced three major arguments for this principle. In the first part of this essay, I reconstruct these arguments and explain Davidson's project of a theory of interpretation as far as it is necessary for this reconstruction. In the second part of my article, it is shown that none of the three arguments for the principle of charity put forward by Davidson is convincing. I also examine the two most important arguments against Davidson's principle. It is demonstrated that these arguments are not compelling, too. The upshot of my discussion is that the debate between proponents and opponents of the principle of charity has reached stalemate.

Schlagworte: Interpretation; Prinzip der Nachsicht; Wahrheit; Davidson

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About the article

Published Online: 2017-01-03

Published in Print: 2017-01-01


Citation Information: Conceptus, Volume 42, Issue 101-102, Pages 108–119, ISSN (Online) 2196-9523, ISSN (Print) 0010-5155, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/cpt-2016-0008.

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