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Actual Causes and Free Will

Carolina Sartorio
Published Online: 2018-03-06 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0002


In this paper I reexamine the debate between two contrasting conceptions of free will: the classical model, which understands freedom in terms of alternative possibilities, and a more recent family of views that focus only on actual causes, and that were inspired by Frankfurt’s famous attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. I offer a novel argument in support of the actual-causes model, one that bypasses the popular debate about Frankfurt-style cases.

Keywords: Causation; actual causes; free will; alternative possibilities; Frankfurt


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About the article

Received: 2017-07-27

Accepted: 2017-02-11

Published Online: 2018-03-06

Published in Print: 2017-10-26

Citation Information: Disputatio, Volume 9, Issue 45, Pages 147–165, ISSN (Online) 0873-626X, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0002.

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© 2018. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. BY-NC-ND 4.0

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