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Naïve Realism and the Conception of Hallucination as Non-Sensory Phenomena

Takuya Niikawa
Published Online: 2018-03-06 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0010

Abstract

In defence of naïve realism, Fish has advocated an eliminativist view of hallucination, according to which hallucinations lack visual phenomenology. Logue, and Dokic and Martin, respectively, have developed the eliminativist view in different manners. Logue claims that hallucination is a non-phenomenal, perceptual representational state. Dokic and Martin maintain that hallucinations consist in the confusion of monitoring mechanisms, which generates an affective feeling in the hallucinating subject. This paper aims to critically examine these views of hallucination. By doing so, I shall point out what theoretical requirements are imposed on naïve realists who characterize hallucinations as non-visual-sensory phenomena.

Keywords: Naïverealism; hallucination; introspection; visual experience; disjunctivism

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About the article

Received: 2017-04-06

Accepted: 2017-08-19

Published Online: 2018-03-06

Published in Print: 2017-11-27


Citation Information: Disputatio, Volume 9, Issue 46, Pages 353–381, ISSN (Online) 0873-626X, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0010.

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© 2018. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. BY-NC-ND 4.0

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