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Articulation and Liars

Sergi Oms
  • University of Barcelona Logos, Research Group in Analytic Philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy University of Barcelona 08001 Barcelona, Spain
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Published Online: 2018-03-06 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0011


Jamie Tappenden was one of the first authors to entertain the possibility of a common treatment for the Liar and the Sorites paradoxes. In order to deal with these two paradoxes he proposed using the Strong Kleene semantic scheme. This strategy left unexplained our tendency to regard as true certain sentences which, according to this semantic scheme, should lack truth value. Tappenden tried to solve this problem by using a new speech act, articulation. Unlike assertion, which implies truth, articulation only implies non-falsity. In this paper I argue that Tappenden’s strategy cannot be successfully applied to truth and the Liar.

Keywords: Paradoxes; truth; vagueness; Sorites; the Liar


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About the article

Received: 2017-10-04

Accepted: 2017-06-15

Published Online: 2018-03-06

Published in Print: 2017-11-27

Citation Information: Disputatio, Volume 9, Issue 46, Pages 383–399, ISSN (Online) 0873-626X, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/disp-2017-0011.

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© 2018. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. BY-NC-ND 4.0

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