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Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung

Ed. by Demmerling, Christoph / Esser, Andrea Marlen / Krüger, Hans-Peter / Menke, Christoph

CiteScore 2018: 0.06

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2018: 0.139
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2018: 0.234

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Volume 57, Issue 5


Realisierung und mentale Verursachung

Sven Walter
Published Online: 2009-12-04 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1524/dzph.2009.0058


The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called 'non-reductive physicalism′ because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of the realization relation has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind. It has only been a couple of years since accounts were proposed according to which realization is understood against the background of the so-called 'causal theory of properties′. At least partially, the hope was to solve the problem of mental causation, in particular the kind of causal exclusion reasoning made famous by Jaegwon Kim, in a way acceptable to non-reductive physicalists. The paper asks whether a proper explication of the realization relation can indeed help explain how physically realized mental properties can be causally efficacious in the causally closed physical world and argues for a negative answer.

Keywords: Kim; mental causation; mental properties; ontology; physicalism

About the article

Published Online: 2009-12-04

Published in Print: 2009-10-01

Citation Information: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung, Volume 57, Issue 5, Pages 689–708, ISSN (Print) 0012-1045, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1524/dzph.2009.0058.

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