Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Show Summary Details
More options …

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie

Zweimonatsschrift der internationalen philosophischen Forschung

Ed. by Demmerling, Christoph / Esser, Andrea Marlen / Honneth, Axel / Krüger, Hans-Peter

6 Issues per year


CiteScore 2016: 0.06

SCImago Journal Rank (SJR) 2016: 0.124
Source Normalized Impact per Paper (SNIP) 2016: 0.454


Online
ISSN
2192-1482
See all formats and pricing
More options …
Volume 63, Issue 6

Issues

Freiheit als Praxisform

Deweys pragmatistische Naturalisierung des Geistes

Jörg Volbers
Published Online: 2015-12-11 | DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2015-0077

Abstract

Dewey’s pragmatism and John McDowell’s philosophy of language share central concerns. They defend a naturalistic vision of the mind (“second nature”) and rely on the concept of experience in order to articulate the contact between mind and world. They differ, though, in their understanding of how the human mind can relate spontaneously to itself and to the world. McDowell links this freedom exclusively to language with the consequence of detaching it from any reflexive determination, turning it into an abstract given. Dewey, by contrast, develops a practice-oriented understanding of freedom and understanding as an essentially precarious cultural form. This allows him to incorporate the reflexive dimension of mental operatiwons, of which McDowell takes no account: It makes a practical difference how the human being conceives its own nature and its own mind.

Keywords: reflexivity; naturalism; second nature; philosophy of language; philosophy of mind

About the article

Published Online: 2015-12-11

Published in Print: 2015-12-01


Citation Information: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Volume 63, Issue 6, Pages 1124–1146, ISSN (Online) 2192-1482, ISSN (Print) 0012-1045, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2015-0077.

Export Citation

© 2015 Akademie Verlag GmbH, Markgrafenstr. 12-14, 10969 Berlin.. Copyright Clearance Center

Comments (0)

Please log in or register to comment.
Log in